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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

DAMAGES-ADDITUR AND ITS USE IN NEBRASKA

A recent Nebraska case,1 outlining the present law on remittitur, evokes a discussion of additur. 2 Additur is the procedural opposite of remittitur. It has been rarely invoked in Nebraska,3 but the possibility of its use presents a question of general interest.
I.

HOW IS ADDITUR USED?

On motion by the plaintiff for a new trial the judge announces
that he will grant the motion unless the defendant agrees to the
judge's increasing the amount of damages. If the defendant
consents, the judge awards an increased verdict to the plaintiff
and denies the motion for a new trial. If the defendant does not
consent, a new trial follows as a matter of course. His consent
is binding upon the defendant, but the plaintiff may appeal the
order denying the new trial if he feels that the amount of the
additur is insufficient.
1 Peacock v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 157 Neb. 514, 60 N.W. 2d 643
(1953).
2 Additur was first considered in the United States in McCoy v. Lemon,
11 Rich. 165 (U. S. 1856), and was not allowed. It has been clearly approved in only a few cases: Morrell v. Gobeil, 84 _N.H. 150, 147 Atl. 413
(1929); Clausing v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67, 224 Pac. 573 (1924); Gaffney v. Illingsworth, 90 N.J.L. 490, 101 Atl. 243 (1917).
3 Calmon v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 114 Neb. 194, 206 N.W. 765
( 19 25). It was used because the jury had failed to allow definitely calculable damages.
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The rule pertaining to the granting of remittitur, which is
authorized in Nebraska by statute,4 has been set out in a series
of Nebraska cases.5 This rule might provide a framework for a
rule governing the allowance of additur. The rule is that remittitur is permitted in Nebraska only when a verdict is so clearly
exorbitant as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice, mistake, or some means not apparent in the record, or
when it is clear that the jury disregarded the evidence or rules
of law. 6 This could be made applicable to additur by substitution
of the word "insufficient" for the word "exorbitant".
II.

WHY ADDITUR?

The usual remedy where damages are inadequate is the setting
aside of the verdict and the granting of a new trial.7 In most
jurisdictions a needless retrial of all the issues can be avoided
by limiting the retrial to the issue of damages. 8 This procedure
has been authorized by the United States Supreme Court.9
Additur has been acclaimed, however, as a more expeditious
process. In a state with crowded court dockets there may be a
long delay between the time of filing a motion for a retrial and
the date of hearing.10 Many litigants can ill afford the long wait
4Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 25-1929 (Supp. 1953).
5 Peacock v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 157 Neb. 514, 60 N. W. 2d 643
(1953); Johnson v. Schrepf, 154 Neb. 317, 47 N. W. 2d 853 (1951);
Remmenga v. Selk, 152 Neb. 625, 42 N.W.2d 186 (1950); Erickson v.
Morrison, 152 Neb. 133, 40 N.W.2d 413 (1950); Thoren v. l\lyers, 151
Neb. 453, 37 N.W.2d 725 (1949); Reuger v. Hawks, 150 Neb. 834, 36
N.W.2d 236 (1949); Horky v. Schroll, 148 Neb. 96, 26 N.W.2d 396
(1947); Van Auker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co., 143 Neb. 24, 8
N.W.2d 451 (1943).
6 Van Aucker v. Steckley's Hybrid Seed Corn Co., 143 Neb. 24, 8
N.W.2d 451 (1943).
7 Goodwin v. Denato, 144 Atl. 177 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1929); Reuter v.
Hickman, Lauson & Diener Co., 160 Wis. 284, 151 N.W. 795 (1915);
Taylor v. Northern Electric Ry., 25 Cal. App. 765, 148 Pac. 543 (1915);
Ferrari v. Brooks-Harrison Fuel Co., 53 Colo. 259, 125 Pac. 125 (1912);
.A\boltin v. Heney, 62 Wash. 65, 113 Pac. 245 (1911); Anglin v. City of
Columbus. 128 Ga. 469, 57 S.E. 780 (1907).
s Note, 15 Va. L. Rev. 592 (1929).
9 Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931);
cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 (a) and Rice v. Union Pac. Ry., 82 F. Supp. 1002 (D
Neb. 1949).
10 Elliott, Judicial Administration 16 3 ( 19 5 3), says, "A nation-wide survey of the status of trial court calendars in 1953 shows that the overall
average time interval from 'at issue' to trial of civil cases in the 97 metropolitan courts covered was 11.5 months for jury cases and 5.7 months
for nonjury cases." The greatest delays reported were in New York Citv
Worcester County in Massachusetts, and Cook County, Illinois. In th~
Supreme Court of Kings County (Brooklyn), the average figure was 53
months, and in New York County (Manhattan), 43 months.
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and many settle out of court for sums substantially less than they
could have received had the case gone before a jury. Additur
eliminates the delay, pares expenses, and provides an end to the
litigation.
Expendiency and the interests of the average litigant thus
form a persuasive argument for the use of additur. Yet there
are problems connected with its use.
III.

CONSTITUTION.AL PROBLEMS

One of the vexing problems is that of constitutionality. In
the case of Dimick v. Schiedt11 a five justice majority of the
United States Supreme Court held the use of additur in the federal courts unconstitutional.12 The Court reasoned that additur
violated the Seventh Amendment by substituting the opinion of
the court on the question of damages for that of the jury.
Remittitur was also condemned, but the Court did not declare
it to be unconstitutional, probably because remittitur had become
too solidly entrenched in American law to be overruled. The
Court therefore distinguished between remittitur and additur,
stating that the jury passed on all lesser sums when setting the
amount of damages, but did not pass upon greater sums.
The Court stated that only those practices known at common
law at the time of the passage of the Seventh Amendment were
acceptable under its terms. Additur had been occasionally used
in England prior to 1791, mostly in cases of mayhem,13 but had
fallen into disuse at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
It has since been expressly condemned by the English courts.14
In a strong dissent the minority cited precedent to show that
the Seventh Amendment was not meant to perpetuate all the
minute procedural details of the common law, but was merely
intended to preserve the essentials of jury trial and to safeguard
the jury's function from encroachments not permitted by the com11293 U.S. 474 (1935).
12 U.S. Const. Amend. VII provides, "In suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules
of common law".
13 Carlin, Remittiturs and Additurs, 49 W. Va. L.Q. 1 (1942).
The
practice, known as super visum vulneris, was used when the court, upon
viewing the wound, might grant extra damages.
14 Watt v. Watt, [1905] A.C. 115.
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mon law.16 No procedure is therefore forbidden if it does not
curtail the power of the jury to decide facts as it would have before the adoption of the amendment.
It seems that here the minority has posed a dilemma and has
been impaled on its horns. In discussing additur and remittitur
the minority stated:
In neither case does the jury return a verdict for the amount
actually recovered, and in both the amount of the recovery is
fixed, not by the verdict, but by the consent of the party resisting
the motion for a new trial.16

It must be noted that the opinion of the minority itself infers
that additur does not allow the jury to find the fact of what
the amount of the verdict should be.17
Since the Seventh Amendment has not been incorporated into
the Fourteenth, Dimick v. Schiedt applies only to Federal
Courts. As far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, state
courts are free to allow or disallow additur as they choose.
State constitutions ordinarily do not contain provisions similar to the Seventh Amendment but simply provide that the right
of trial by jury should remain inviolate.18 Thus state courts need
not determine whether additur is a re-examination of a fact tried
by a jury.
Nebraska's constitution provides that the right to trial by
jury should remain inviolate;19 this has been determined to mean
nothing more than a declaration of the common law as to the
mode of trial. 20 Therefore additur probably could constitutionally
be used in Nebraska.
Additur might be utilized when the amount of damages is
liquidated and certain, or when the amount of damages could be
15 Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co. 283 U.S. 494 (1931),
followed in Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
16 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 494 (1935).
17 For a thorough discussion of this point see Schiedt v. Dimick, 70 F.2d
528 (1st Cir. 1934).
18 44 Yale L.J. 319 ( 1934).
19 Neb. Const. Art. I, § 2 provides: "The right of trial by jury shall
remain inviolate, but the legislature may authorize trial by a jury of a
less number than twelve in courts inferior to the district court, and may
by general law authorize a verdict in civil cases in any court by not less
than five-sixths of the jury."
20 Omaha Fire Insurance Co. v. Thompson, 50 Neb. 580, 70 N.W. 30
(1897).
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determined by fixed rules of law. In such situations the1·e could
be no question of a usurpation of the task of the jury.
Wisconsin follows a unique practice, allowing additur in
cases where the damages are uncertain, provided that the defendant will consent to such a large increase that any further
increase would wan-ant the court's setting aside the same amount
as excessive.21
CONCLUSION

Since the use of additur is open in Nebraska and its expendiency is conceded, it is submitted that additur should be
used in cases where damages can clearly be determined.
The shadow of deprivation of the right to jury trial is heavy
enough, however, that additur would be a quite questionable device if used where the amount of damages is uncertain. It is
an unquestionable fact that when unliquidated damages are involved the use of additur means the substitution of the judgment
of the court for the judgment of the jury. When such substitution occurs, it is impossible to contend that the jury has tried the
issue of damages. In such cases there has been a deprivation of
the right to trial by jury.
James W. Hewitt, '56.

21 Reuter v. Hickman, Lauson & Diener Co., 160 Wis. 284, 151 N.W.
795 (1915).

